Research

Job Market Paper

Deposits in a Digital Era: Central Bank Digital Currency, Capital Structure, and Bank Risk Taking (PDF)

Abstract There has been concern about how new digital money competing with bank deposits could impact the quality of bank lending. I develop a model to study how the usage of deposits as a means of payment affects the capital structure and effort of banks with risky investments. Because deposits are used in transactions and carry a liquidity premium, they are a relatively inexpensive source of funding for banks. My model endogenizes this liquidity premium and shows how the provision of deposits creates a moral hazard problem. When deposits are necessary for payments, banks will never exert the socially optimal level of effort. The effect of introducing a new payment asset that could raise banks' funding costs, such as a central bank digital currency (CBDC), depends on banks' net worth. If banks turn to capital funding as the cost of deposits increases, the riskiness of bank lending decreases. But if banks do not have enough net worth to raise more capital funding, riskiness can instead increase. This highlights the potential tradeoffs between improving payment efficiency and lowering the quality of bank credit for total welfare.

Works in progress

  • The Payments System and the Cost of Production

  • Risky Entrepreneurship and Taxation